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ABSTRACT1230
'Flows of illicit money can damage the integrity, stability and reputation of the 
financial sector, and threaten the internal market of the Union as well as 
international development. Money laundering, terrorism financing and 
organized crime remain significant problems which should be addressed at 
Union level:1231 
This legal analysis is geared towards showcasing the major concerns which arise 
from the crime of money laundering and its intrinsic link with terrorism­
financing. Recent global enforcement actions against financial institutions 
highlight the importance of compliance with anti-money laundering and 
terrorism-financing regulations. Such enforcement actions are clear proof that 
despite the considerable progress made in mitigating risks posed by money 
laundering and rooting out prior wrongdoing, financial institutions are still 
falling short of regulators' expectations. 
The focal-point of this study is the recently-enacted Fourth EU Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive. Salient aspects of this Directive shall be addressed all 
throughout and a comparative analysis shall be carried out with regard to the 
changes it has brought about from previous EU anti-money laundering 
Directives, specifically the Third AML Directive. Apart from analyzing the impact 
of the new AML provisions on Maltese legislation, other jurisdictions shall also 
be taken into consideration, so as to better highlight the effect of this new 
Directive on cross-border jurisdictions and businesses. Furthermore, the main 
pitfalls of AMLD4 shall be examined and possible solutions for future 
ameliorations shall be put forward. 
KEYWORDS: FOURTH EU ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE - DOMESTIC 
INTERPRETATION - TERRORISM FINANCING - FUTURE ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING CHALLENGES 
mo This policy paper was reviewed by Diane Bugeja, currently reading for a PhD degree in Law 
at King's College, London. 
1231 Directive EU 2015/849 para 1. 
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1. General Introduction
Money laundering is a reality which has become of primary concern for every 
government due to the negative repercussions that it may have on the integrity 
of the financial and economic system.1232 The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering
Directive (Hereinafter referred to as 'the Directive' or 'the Fourth Directive') has 
recently been published in May 2015 and it focuses on the prevention of the use 
of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist 
financing; already, plans are in the pipeline for further revisions to this Directive. 
But what exactly do these crimes constitute? 
In the words of Min Zhu, Deputy Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (Hereinafter referred to as 'IMF'), 
Money Laundering and the financing of terrorism are financial crimes 
with economic effects. They can threaten the stability of a country's 
financial sector or its external stability more generally. Effective anti­
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regimes are 
essential to protect the integrity of markets and of the global financial 
framework as they help mitigate the factors that facilitate financial abuse. 
Action to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing 
thus responds not only to a moral imperative, but also to an economic 
need.1233 
Indeed, this new Directive is geared towards benefitting businesses, government 
and law enforcement by ensuring that resources can be targeted towards the 
areas of higher risk. Mainly, it aims to achieve a more risk-based approach, with 
greater consistency of rules across the EU, simplifying cross border trade and 
implementing the Financial Action Task Force (Hereinafter referred to as 'FATF') 
recommendations. 
1232 
1233 
Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money 
Laundering (Institute for International Economics 2004) 130. 
The IMF and the Fight against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism Factsheet 
(International Monetary Fund, 6 October 2016) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm> accessed 6 November 2016. 
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2. Historical Background
In the past, the definition of what entails a criminal activity for the purposes of 
money laundering was very restrictive as it entailed robbery, fraud, as well as 
dealing in drugs or other illicit substances. Therefore, handling the proceeds 
from any such activity would amount to money laundering. Traditionally, the 
crime of money laundering has been described as being a process whereby 
criminals attempt to hide the origins and ownership of the profits earned 
through criminal activities. Such methods would enable these criminals to retain 
control over the proceeds and provide them with an alibi for their profits. 
It is essential to note that the crime of money laundering is not a new 
phenomenon. Indeed, Sterling Seagrave, a British historian, wrote about how 
Chinese merchants over three thousand years ago, laundered the profits they 
made due to the prohibition imposed by the regional governments on many 
forms of commercial trading.1234 Thus, Chinese traders used to hide their wealth
out of fear of being robbed of their assets by the respective governments. The 
Chinese merchants used to employ a technique, which is still popular up to this 
day, whereby the money launderers' profits would be invested in offshore 
financial centers. The term 'laundering' is said to have originated around the time 
Chicago gangster, Al Capone, embarked on his crime spree. In fact, he used the 
profits of the intense business of launderettes to disguise the illegal proceeds he 
earned from alcohol he imported in times of prohibition in the 1920s.1z3s 
However, the term 'money laundering' was first used in a newspaper reporting 
about the Watergate scandal of 1973 in the United States.1236
Anti-money laundering issues have undeniably attracted more worldwide 
attention in the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century due to the 
ever-increasing complex systems of money laundering. As Healy rightly argues, 
the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States of America have 
highlighted new challenges to law enforcement agencies around the world in 
detecting and combatting elaborate money laundering systems used to finance 
international terrorism.1237 Indeed, in the Unites States, prior to 2001 terrorist
attacks, the crime of money laundering was regulated by the Bank Secrecy Act, 
but since 2001, there has been the introduction of the USA Patriot Act which was 
1234 Inter-American Development Bank (2004 ), Unlocking Credit: The Quest for Deep and Stable 
Bank Lending, 241. 
ms 8. Unger and D. Van der Linde, Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 
2013) 3. 
1236 J. Richards (1999), Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime, and Money 
Laundering, CRC Press, 43. 
1237 NM Healy, 'The impact of September 11th on Anti-Money Laundering efforts, and the 
European Union and Commonwealth gatekeeper initiatives' (2001) 26 The International 
Lawyer 733. 
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stimulated by the 9 /11 terrorist attack. 
3. An Attempt to a Definition
The IMF defines money laundering as the 'process by which the illicit source of 
assets obtained or generated by criminal activity is concealed to obscure the link 
between the funds and the original criminal activity'.1238 Even though money
laundering may seem to be a linear process, the process can be complicated as it 
involves a number of actors and methods which makes it also very difficult to be 
traced by the relevant authorities. Indeed, according to the Fourth European 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the crime of money laundering can be 
committed intentionally in the following ways: 
a) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the
property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of
such an activity to evade the legal consequences of that person's action;
b) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property,
knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an
act of participation in such an activity;
c) The acquisition, possession or use of property, with full knowledge upon
receipt that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an
act of participation in such an activity;
d) Participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding,
abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of any of the above­
mentioned actions.1239
Hence, it is very clear that the European Union is aware of the constant threat 
being imposed by this crime and acknowledges the various shades the crime can 
take so as to manifest itself. Indeed, this latest EU Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive was stimulated by the fairly recent terrorist attacks which took place in 
1238 
1239 
The IMF and the Fight against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism Factsheet 
(International Monetary Fund, 6 October 2016) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm> accessed 6 November 2016. 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing [2015] OJ L141/73, art 1(3). 
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Copenhagen, Paris and Brussels, and which were all triggered through money­
laundering.1240 
4. The Directive's Implications
In general, the Directive, which is to be transposed into local legislation by 26 
June 2017, strives to ensure consistency across borders. The Third Directive was 
not implemented consistently by Member States and thus, the intention of this 
Fourth Directive was mainly that of creating a more coherent cross-border 
approach, which will simplify cross-border trade by ensuring that legislation is 
adopted consistently in each Member State. Consequently, businesses should be 
able to operate more effectively between jurisdictions because the 
inconsistencies in legislation would be reduced, allowing organisations to 
streamline systems and reduce costs. 
In relation to the gaming sector, the Directive proposes to bring all providers of 
gambling services within the scope of the regulation, including online gambling, 
and not just land-based casinos. In addition, for the gambling sector, Customer 
Due Diligence (Hereinafter referred to as 'COD') will henceforth be required for 
single transactions of €2,000 or more.1241 The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering
Directive allows discretion to Member States to make a case for scoping out 
certain gambling services providers on the basis of these presenting a low risk of 
money laundering, although any such arguments are likely to be difficult to 
justify in light of the anonymity, remoteness, multi-jurisdictional reach and other 
similar factors that make the gambling sector prone to being exploited by 
criminals in their furtherance of their money laundering activities. As a result of 
such a requirement, businesses in the gambling sector which are now within the 
scope of the Directive will have to implement systems and controls to prevent 
money laundering, including undertaking COD, training staff, monitoring 
transactions, keeping records and reporting suspicious transactions; equally, 
regulators will have to become conversant with the specific money laundering 
risks presented by the online gambling sector and up their resources to cater for 
the wider reach of the Directive. 
A second area tackled by this new Directive is that of tax crimes, which are now 
to be included within the definition of an offence. Indeed, tax evasion and other 
serious fiscal crimes will become criminal offences in all EU member states. The 
impact of this will be that businesses operating in jurisdictions in which tax 
mo Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
The European Agenda on Security' (COM 2015) 185 final. 
1241 Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing [2015] OJ 1141/73, art 11. 
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evasion is not currently a crime will need to review their current systems to 
ensure compliance. 
The Directive has also repealed the 'white-list' of jurisdictions outside the EU 
which the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive had implemented. Indeed, this 
Fourth EU Directive now requires each obliged person (i.e. those persons subject 
to the requirements of the Directive) to conduct a risk assessment for that 
specific country outside of the EU where business is to be done1242, therefore 
placing additional responsibility on obliged persons in deciding whether a 
particular jurisdiction is to be considered reputable or otherwise. 
Simplified Due Diligence (Hereinafter referred to as 'SOD') is another area in 
respect of which changes are being made in the Fourth Directive. The risk-based 
approach adopted by this Fourth EU Directive includes more stringent COD 
measures. Previous Anti-Money Laundering regulations permitted certain 
customers and products to qualify for the due diligence procedure when they fell 
within a certain category. The Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive now 
requires obliged persons to determine the level of money laundering risk posed 
by any customer prior to the due diligence status, providing a justification for 
qualification.1243 Indeed, previously, businesses could apply simplified due 
diligence in certain situations, which reduced the regulatory burden; such 
blanket exemptions were considered by the EU as being too permissive and 
lenient With the introduction of this Directive, it is expected that obliged 
persons will be required to assess whether a transaction or customer 
relationship is low risk on the basis of certain risk-related criteria and act 
accordingly. Hence, obliged persons may be able to apply SOD only if they are 
satisfied that the customer or transaction presents a lower degree of risk and can 
evidence this through supporting documentation which may eventually be 
challenged by the regulator. The Directive lists potentially lower risk factors 
which obliged persons should consider in making their assessment. 
On the other hand, the Directive introduced a requirement to conduct Enhanced 
Due Diligence (Hereinafter referred to as 'EDD') for domestic Politically Exposed 
Persons (Hereinafter referred to as 'PEPs') ( e.g. MPs, judges or high ranking 
army officials) as well as foreign PEPs.1244 Thus, businesses will need to amend 
their systems and controls to ensure that they can identify domestic PEPs. The 
policies and procedures will need to be revised so employees know what the 
EDD requirements are for such clients. The Directive also provides a non­
exhaustive list of higher risk factors that obliged persons are bound to consider 
1242 
1243 
1244 
ibid art 7. 
ibid art 10 and art 13(5). 
ibid art 18. 
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in addressing business relationships or occasional transactions that may present 
a higher risk of money laundering and in respect of which EDD measures may be 
appropriate. 
Moreover, the Directive introduced increased due diligence for employees. 
Indeed, there is a provision in the Directive requiring businesses to have policies, 
controls and procedures which cover employee screening.124s Hence, businesses
that do not screen employees at present will need to consider how to verify 
employees, which could be costly and time consuming. Automated screening 
systems may provide a solution while providing reassurance for the business, 
particularly if the checks include the asylum and immigration requirements. 
The new Directive also introduced a reduction in the threshold for cash 
transactions. Under the current regime, a €15,000 threshold for cash 
transactions is applicable, i.e. persons dealing in cash above this threshold in 
connection with a single transaction or a series of linked transactions, is 
considered to be engaging in a 'relevant activity' and must comply with the 
requirements set forth in the anti-money laundering regime; this threshold has 
been lowered to €10,000 under the new Directive. 
Increased level of transparency of beneficial ownership and record retention is 
another aspect featured in this new Directive, which shall apply for both 
companies and trusts. Businesses should be aware of this implementation and 
that it is likely to impose significant administrative burdens on companies and 
trusts. Indeed, similarly to the Third EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, 
obliged persons are requested to identify and manage due diligence on any 
customer that controls more than 25% of the shares or voting rights ( or other 
elements which may be indicative of a controlling position) of a customer.1246
However, through the Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, a more 
rigorous record retention requirement for beneficial ownership is put in place. 
Now, each Member State will be required to maintain a registry containing 
information about beneficial owners.1247 This new Directive provides that the
mentioned registers ought to be accessible to the authorities of each Member 
State and their Financial Intelligence Units without any restriction.1248 The
registers are also to be available to obliged persons and also to the public 
through registration. 
ms ibid art 8 (4)(a). 
1246 ibid art 13 
1247 ibid art 30. 
ms ibid art 30(5). 
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This new Directive provides for three levels of risk assessment - a supra-national 
risk assessment, a national risk assessment, and a risk assessment process at the 
level of each obliged person, each of which should identify and locate the main 
risks relating to anti-money laundering. Such risk assessments are expected to 
assist the Member States' obliged persons in developing their own procedures 
for anti-money laundering risk assessments. Malta has followed closely with the 
risk assessment procedure and towards the end of 2013, the Maltese 
Government had entrusted the task to lead the national risk assessment in 
question to the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (Hereinafter referred to as 
'FIAU').1249 The National Risk Assessment should provide regulated businesses 
with a clear picture of the risks and threats in their country which will help them 
to identify, manage and mitigate their own risks. Indeed, this risk assessment is 
necessary to identify the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing 
affecting the internal market. Obliged persons are already required, under the 
current regime, to undertake written risk assessments which will have to be 
made available to the regulator upon request. Those businesses which do not 
have a clear picture of their risks and how to mitigate them, should undertake a 
risk assessment process henceforth. This is also regarded as a good business 
practice. 
When it comes to the issue of data protection, it is generally accepted that there 
is a need to balance the requirements of the anti-money laundering/counter 
terrorist financing regimes with the data protection rights of individuals. 
Member States will now have to consider how to transpose the requirements 
into national legislation particularly around data. Businesses should review what 
data they hold and for how long so they comply with the existing data protection 
obligations, which will help to prepare for the new requirements. 
Under the Directive, it is proposed that administrative sanctions for breaches of 
the key requirements of the Directive are strengthened, including a proposal to 
impose a fine of up to ten percent ( or even twenty percent) of the total annual 
turnover of a business and twice ( or even ten times) the amount of profit gained 
(or losses avoided) through the breach.12so These proposals demonstrate the 
need for businesses to ensure that they have robust procedures, 
systems/controls and resource (including staff) in place to ensure compliance. 
1249 
1250 
'Analysis to consider risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in Malta' Times of 
Malta (Malta, 18 December 2013) 
<http:/ /www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view /20131218 /local/analysis-to-consider-risks­
of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing.499524> accessed 27 August 2015. 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing [2015] OJ L141/73, art 59. 
280 
ELSA MALT A LAW REVIEW 
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Copenhagen, Paris and Brussels, the 
European Commission together with the Council agreed to take strong decisive 
action against any form of terrorist-financing. Indeed, so as to enhance the 
efficiency of these new anti-money laundering regulations, these two EU 
institutions have called for further efforts towards speeding up the national 
processes of implementation of the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 
This will in turn strengthen cooperation on the combat against terrorist­
financing between the various Member States' Financial Intelligence Units 
(Hereinafter referred to as FIU). Any terrorist-financing risks are then to be 
addressed via the EU supranational risk-assessment. Indeed, the EU constantly 
stresses upon the fact that coordinated action at international, European and 
national level is essential so as to truly tackle the threats posed by money 
laundering and terrorist-financing as effectively as possible. The Commission 
shall also be examining further actions and initiatives that may be adopted on 
countering terrorist-financing in the context of implementing the recently 
adopted European Security Agenda.12s1 
Even though the Directive has not yet been implemented by the EU Member 
States, the European Commission has already geared its direction towards new 
steps and procedures to tackle the identified loopholes of this new Directive. It 
has in fact issued an Action Plan aimed on two main focal strands of action, 
namely, (i.) tracing any threatening terrorists through their financial movements 
and preventing them from transferring any funds or other assets; and (ii.) 
disrupting the roots and sources of revenue known to be used by terrorist 
organisations, by targeting and distorting their capacity to raise funds.12s2 As 
regards the first strand of action, the Commission has called upon all EU Member 
States to commit to implement the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive into 
their domestic laws by the end of 2016 instead of June 2017. As had been 
requested during the extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council of the 20 
November 2015, the Commission recently proposed a number of targeted 
amendments to the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Such proposed 
amendments include both short-term and long-term initiatives, namely, 
a) including a list laying down all compulsory checks and CDD measures that
financial institutions ought to carry out on financial flows from third
States having high-risk strategic deficiencies in their national anti-money
1251 'European Parliament backs stronger rules to combat money laundering and terrorism 
financing' (European Commission, 20 May 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-5001_en.htm> accessed 20 March 2016. 
1252 Peter Snowdon and Lisa Lee, 'Commission presents Action Plan to strengthen the fight 
against terrorist financing' (Financial Services: Regulation Tomorrow, 3 February 2016) 
<http://www.regulationtomorrow.com/eu/commission-presents-action-plan-to­
strengthen-the-fight-against-terrorist-financing/> accessed 2 April 2016. 
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laundering and counter-terrorism financing (Hereinafter referred to as 
'CTF') regimes; 
b) widening the scope of information and data accessible by the national
FIUs;
c) enabling faster and easier cooperation and communication methods for 
the various EU FIUs to access information on the holders of bank and
payment accounts by introducing centralized bank and payment account
registers;
d) bringing virtual currency exchange platforms under the scope of the
Fourth Directive and the control of competent national authorities so that
such platforms too would have to apply COD controls when exchanging
virtual currency for real currency, and potentially including virtual
currency 'wallet providers';
e) widening customer verification requirements for prepaid instruments and
lowering the thresholds for identification. 1253 Gaps in the EU-US Terrorism
Financing Tracking Programme (Hereinafter referred to as 'TFTP'), which
has been in force since August 2010, will also be tackled. In addition, the
Commission has claimed that in 2017 it will table a legislative Proposal
geared to reinforce the powers of customs authorities and thereby
address terrorism-financing through trade in goods. Another Commission
Proposal is envisaged to address the illicit trade in cultural goods and
wildlife. The Commission has also urged all Member States and their
relevant AML authorities to work hand-in-hand with third countries so as
to create stronger cooperation and ensure a global response to tackling
sources of terrorist-financing. Indeed, as Dr. Jean-Claude Juncker, the
President of the European Commission himself, validly propounded, 'The
recent terrorist attacks on Europe's people and values were coordinated
across borders, showing that we must work together to resist these
threats.'1254 
As has been evidenced during the recent Paris terrorist attacks, prepaid cards 
are very often used as a major tool by terrorists to anonymously finance their 
attacks. Whilst acknowledging the benefits of such prepaid cards to many 
citizens, the Commission is also aware of the many risks stemming from the 
anonymity of some of these prepaid instruments and intends to amend Fourth 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive so as to specifically address these concerns 
without doing away with the potential benefits of such cards when used 
normally. Indeed, a timeline to implement these actions has also been published 
1253 ibid. 
1254 Jean-Claude Juncker, 'Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Terrorist Financing' 
(European Agenda on Security Factsheet, European Commission February 2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/aml-factsheet_en.pdf> accessed 13 April 2016. 
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by the Commission, highlighting the targeted deadlines. 
Thus, as has been constantly reiterated throughout this analysis paper, all 
obliged entities should now start considering how the Directive might impact 
their businesses and their customers, while onboarding employees with the new 
anti-money laundering compliance requirements. Given the problematic issues 
created by the late implementation of Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive in 
certain Member States such as Ireland, it is hoped that the Fourth Directive will 
be implemented on time by June 2017 and that financial institutions would have 
by then updated their compliance programs in readiness for that date. 
5. The Current Maltese Situation
Malta's commitment in the fight against money laundering is essential for the 
country in protecting its role as a reputable financial services center and an 
international hub for gaming companies to operate. Under current Maltese Jaw, 
the main regulatory Act governing money laundering is the Prevention of Money 
Laundering Actizss (Hereinafter referred to as 'PMLA'), which was introduced in
1994 so as to augment the effectiveness of other legal provisions found in the 
Criminal Code,1256 namely, Sub-Title IV which deals with acts of terrorism,
funding of terrorism and ancillary offences. In addition, the PMLA and the 
Criminal Code's relevant provisions are further supplemented by the Prevention 
of Money Laundering and Funding of Terrorism Regulations (Hereinafter 
referred to as 'PMLFTR'). It is to be noted that whilst the PMLFTR list out the 
substantive provisions and procedures to be adopted relating to the offences in 
question, the Act establishes the foundations for the legal framework regulating 
money laundering. The PMLA lays down the procedures for the investigation and 
prosecution of money laundering offences as well as establishing the FIAU. 
The term 'money laundering' is defined in Article 2 of the PMLA, whereby the 
material element of the crime is laid down, accompanied with the intentional 
element, 
a) Converting or transferring property, with the knowledge that such
property is derived from criminal activity or participation in such activity,
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the origin of the property or
assisting a person involved in criminal activity.
b) Concealing or disguising the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, right over or the ownership of property with the knowledge
1255 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Chapter373 of the Laws of Malta. 
1256 Criminal Code, Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta. 
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that such property is derived from criminal activity or any participation 
therein. 
c) Acquiring property with the knowledge that such property is derived
from criminal activity or any participation therein.
d) Retaining without reasonable excuse property with the knowledge that
such property is derived from criminal activity or any participation
therein.
e) Any attempt at or complicity in any of the above matters or activities.
Following the implementation of the Third EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, 
the PMLA has been amended to define the term 'criminal activity' for the 
purposes of money laundering as any criminal offence or acts of terrorism as 
defined under the Maltese Criminal Code. Therefore, Malta adopts an 'all-crimes' 
regime in respect of money laundering offences, such that the handling of profits 
from any activity that is considered to be a crime under Maltese Law would 
amount to money laundering. 
It is fundamental to note that, in addition to the position adopted in the Third EU 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the recent Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive has broadened the definition of what 'criminal activity' would amount 
to money laundering. As indicated earlier, the newly-enacted Directive now also 
includes tax crimes, relating to both direct and indirect taxes.12s1 This new step
in this Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive aims at developing a harsher 
fight against tax crimes and terrorist financing. 
According to Article 4 of the PMLA, the Attorney General may, if he has 
reasonable cause to suspect that a person is guilty of an offence involving money 
laundering, apply to the Criminal Court requesting the issue of an investigation 
order, so as to provide access to any place for the purpose of searching for any 
material relevant to the said suspected offence. Such an investigation order 
cannot be countered by the issue of a warrant of prohibitory injunction. The 
Attorney General may also apply for an attachment order in the same 
circumstances, which may be issued together with an investigation order and has 
the effect of attaching, in the hands of the garnishees, all money and other 
1257 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, 
COM/2013/045 final. 
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movable property due or belonging to the suspect. 125s
In addition, according to Article 4B of the PMLA, the Attorney General may 
request a monitoring order, whereby he may apply to the Criminal Court for such 
a monitoring order to be issued, on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that a 
person or legal entity is guilty of a money laundering offence. The order, if 
upheld by the Court, would require the relative bank/s to monitor the 
transactions or banking operations being carried out through the bank 
account(s) of the suspected person/s. This order may be requested at any time 
before, during, or after the commission of the suspected offence and has thereby 
proved to be a successful tool available to the Attorney General in tackling 
money laundering related crimes. 1z59 
As hinted earlier on, the PMLA also sets up the FIAU which is a body corporate 
having a distinct legal personality, and the national central agency charged with 
enforcing the provisions of the PMLA in Malta. It is responsible for the collection, 
collation, processing, analysis and dissemination of information of suspected 
money laundering or terrorist financing-related activities, thereby supporting 
the domestic and international prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing law enforcement effort.1260 Nonetheless, it is important to note that
Maltese legislation will soon undergo a major shift due to the transposition and 
harmonization of the Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive into domestic 
Jaw, mostly in relation to the establishment of a risk-based customer due 
diligence as well as risk-based supervision. Indeed, Implementing Procedures 
issued by the FIAU are binding on subject persons and are divided into two parts; 
namely, Part I includes general obligations mandatory on all subject persons, 
whereas Part II contains sector-specific guidance. 
Moreover, Malta is also part of MONEYVAL, which is a committee of experts on 
the evaluation of anti-money laundering measures and the financing of terrorism 
which was established in 1997 by the Committee of Ministers of Europe and 
which continues to enhance the protection awarded to combat crimes related to 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
6. Conclusion
It may be concluded that the overall idea of the Fourth EU Anti-Money 
ms 'Prevention of Money Laundering and Funding of Terrorism Activities in Malta' (GVZH 
Advocates, 16 January 2011) <http://www.csb-advocates.com/malta-law­
articles/prevention-money-laundering-and-funding-terrorism-activities-malta> accessed on 
27th August 2015. 
1259 ibid. 
1260 ibid. 
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Laundering Directive is consistent with the EU Directives which had been 
published earlier, mainly the Third EU Directive. However, as has been 
highlighted throughout this legal paper, through this new Directive there have 
been various new developments which strongly favour the risk-based approach 
and a greater level of transparency when it comes to the origin and circulation of 
money, especially across EU frontiers. For instance, when considering the 
national gaming sector, the current Remote Gaming Regulations established by 
the Malta Gaming Authority already provide for anti-money laundering 
measures, including an obligation on licensees to verify the identity, age and 
residence of a player before making a payment exceeding €2330. Hence, the 
Fourth Directive's reduction of the single transaction threshold to €2000 should 
not pose a major impact on operators of the remote gaming industry that are 
licensed in Malta. Thus, although under the Fourth Directive all remote gaming 
operators will be considered as obliged entities for the first time in the history of 
EU anti-money laundering legislation, under Maltese law remote gaming 
operators have already been subjected to some form of anti-money laundering 
regulations, such as those established in terms of the Remote Gaming 
Regulations and the Lotteries and Other Games Act.1261 However, the anti-money 
laundering measures which will eventually be enacted to transpose the Fourth 
Directive go into much further detail and stipulate more onerous obligations 
when compared to current anti-money laundering obligations. 
When it comes to the national risk-assessment requirement imposed by the 
Fourth Directive, towards the end of 2013, the Maltese Government had already 
initiated and entrusted the task of leading a national risk-assessment procedure 
upon the domestic FIAU. Once this project is concluded the Government would 
be expected to take all the necessary measures to offset any risks identified in 
such national risk-assessment. Moreover, the Directive now also imposes the 
requirement that all assessments carried out by financial entities need to be 
based on a risk-based approach. Thus, all obliged entities must now carry out 
their risk-assessments and CDD on the basis of the type of transaction in 
question and the degree of risk posed by the customer or third State being dealt 
with. Such entities will then be held accountable by the national regulators for 
any decisions they may take under such a risk-based approach. Although the 
carrying out of risk-assessments is not a novel concept under Maltese legislation, 
the Fourth Directive's shift towards a risk-based approach is envisaged to leave a 
considerable impact on the application of anti-money laundering and CTF 
procedures by national subject-persons. In addition, the Fourth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive will surely leave a huge impact on Maltese anti-money 
laundering legislation in relation to the new requirements imposed on corporate 
1261 Lotteries and Other Games Act, Chapter 438 of the Laws of Malta. 
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entities and trusts with regard to the recording of beneficial ownership 
information. 
Hence, it is very evident that the enhanced focus on a risk-based approach and 
the stronger emphasis placed on strengthening the cooperation between the 
various FIUs clearly shows that previous errors have been taken into 
consideration whilst drafting this new Directive, and possibly also improved 
upon. Indeed, it is an undisputed fact that a proactive implementation strategy 
will aid in ensuring that global financial and business institutions understand, at 
an early stage, the challenges posed by this implementation procedure and can 
thereby bring their current existent global anti-money laundering programs in 
conformity with the Fourth Directive in a timely and efficient manner. As held by 
Stuart Gulliver, Chief Executive of HSBC, at the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards 2013, 'our [bank's] geographic footprint became very 
attractive to trans-national criminal organisations, whether they are terrorist in 
origin or criminal in origin.'1262 Hence, each State must do its utmost to 
collectively combat such trans-national criminal activities and ensure better 
safeguards for their prevention. 
Money laundering is a very sophisticated crime and we must be equally 
sophisticated.1263
1262 Steve Slater, 'HSBS's global spread left it open to crime: CEO' (Reuters, 6 February 2013) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-inquiry-idUSBRE91SODZ20130206> accessed 
13 April 2016. 
1263 Janet Reno, while serving as Attorney General of the United States from 1993 to 2001. 
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